levels. On the domestic political scene, the insistence on Russia's alliances and its geopolitical successes is broadly aimed at containing this growing discontent.
3
This article seeks first of all to show that the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) 3 is an attempt to create a political bloc that is not based on any solid legal foundation or on any mutual obligation linking the participating countries. Despite the manoeuvring of Russian diplomats to attract new members to the group, such as India and Iran, the prospects for converting the SCO into an effective structure are still rather vague. Whatever efforts the Russian government may be making to convert India to the idea of building a union between the three countries, there is no question of multilateral integration in the SCO structures: decision-making is still bilateral (Russo-Indian or Russo-Chinese). It is also important to take account of the fact that the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry is at present better equipped for managing bilateral relations than multilateral relations: it operates through different departments and highly specialised services, and can count on few staff working to promote multilateral co-operation. 4 Secondly, the article describes the significant progress made towards consolidating military forces within the context of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Yet, this organisation is far from forming a real politico-military bloc of ex-USSR countries. It is no more than an attempt, on the part of the Russian Federation, to redefine its own area of influence. Moscow's initiatives in this sphere over these past two years show that building up the CSTO is being achieved far more rapidly and efficiently than the efforts towards integration within the SCO. But the acceleration of this process is coming up against several obstacles. In particular, there are tensions within the governing class as well as a lack of clear-sightedness or political will when it comes to the prospects for re-establishing power in the post-Soviet world. Indeed, the confrontation between the new elite ("new Russians", bankers, liberal businessmen, oligarchs) and the representatives of the old Soviet military-industrial complex does not favour the shaping of a clear national idea. Such internal tensions within Russian society also impede the smooth running of government agencies, and have a particularly deleterious effect on the financing of military programmes and the equipping of the federal armed services. These difficulties notwithstanding, the CSTO structures are much more active than the "amorphous mass" of the SCO: they make up the spine of what could come to be a military force, one that might, for example, intervene in cases of internal conflict within the Central-Asian space of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). One such case was the CSTO's participation in the "pacification" of the situation in Bishkek, in March 2005, which kept chaos at bay in Kyrgyzstan 4 . Even so, it is still rather early to claim that Russia and the other members of the CSTO are on the eve of creating a real military union. This stage is not foreseeable without radical changes to the ideology that underlies Russian political life and without a greater affirmation of will by the CSTO members. Finally, we shall emphasise that it takes more than mere willpower to create a political alliance. Russia cannot realistically claim to strengthen its strategic partnerships in Central and East Asia without resolving the serious problems affecting the national economy and the federal army. Otherwise, any political union can only change into an alliance between unequal partners: a strong China, a weak Russia and the handful of "spare parts" represented by the other countries of the former Soviet Union. So it is important to question the effective capacity of Russia to implement its plans for military integration, whether in the Central Asian area or within the Moscow-DelhiPeking relationship.
Towards a Sino-Indo-Russian alliance? 6 Some politicians yearn for the creation of a great coalition uniting India, Russia and China and capable of matching the power of the "Golden Billion", specifically Europe and the United States, whose people are rich economically but demographically weak 5 . The notion of strengthening Sino-Russian relations has been revived since the war in Yugoslavia, on the eve of Boris Yeltsin's political retirement. During his last visit to Peking, in 1998, the Russian President declared that the United States could not enforce its will on China and Russia. This declaration was taken by the Americans as a threat to create a Sino-Russian bloc, although Chinese diplomats swiftly distanced themselves from the idea. When Evgeny Primakov was Foreign Minister in 1999, Asia was a priority concern for Russian foreign policy. Even since his resignation, this former Prime Minister, now head of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, still wields decisive influence over Russia's policy towards Asia 6 . The dream of an alliance between three of the biggest and most populous countries on the planet, in which Moscow could again play a significant role, has its roots back in the time of the Comintern, when the Kremlin's emissaries were striving to create a military alliance with Sun Yat-sen's China. Yet, most Russian Sinologists 7 exclude, in principle, any possibility of a union with China. They point, rightly, to the lessons of the history of Sino-Russian relations, marked by incessant conflicts ever since the sixteenth century 8 . The renaissance of a "Sino-Soviet friendship", as reflected in attempts at political and economic integration, could have catastrophic consequences for Russia. It would be forced into a situation of inferiority, given the central government's weak control over the Russian Far Eastern Federal District and the absence of a clear line on foreign policy. The plan for a close Sino-Russian alliance is further discredited by the fact that China has already repeatedly declared 9 its opposition to forming a union with any other country-Russia included 10 .
7
Bringing India into a Sino-Russian union seems even less realistic. The alliance between China and India, whose frontier dispute is still not settled, is undermined by India's desire to control the situation in South Asia-in opposition to China's wishes. A RussoIndian rapprochement seems just as improbable: it is difficult to understand what Primakov may have been referring to when he spoke of the "coincidence of the interests of India and Russia in the Pacific area" 11 . The main raison d'être for any RussoIndian union would be as a defence against Chinese domination in the Pacific region 12 . If India did need to form a friendship with another geopolitical power in the Central Asian region, it would more probably be with the United States than with China or Russia. The recent Russo-Indian military manoeuvres ("Indra 2005"), October 16th 2005, are admittedly a symbolic step towards realising Primakov's idea; but they were an extremely limited affair-only 130 Russian soldiers and 90 Indian soldiers actually took part.
8
Even so, information from sources within the CSTO in Moscow suggests that, in February 2006, the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry opened discussions with Indian diplomats on the possibility of enlarging the SCO and on whether Delhi might possibly take part in its forums. There are two reasons behind the interest shown by India in joining this organisation. Firstly, because of the unstable situation created by the possibility of a military crisis over Iran, India is forced into seeking to secure, as quickly as possible, access to energy sources in post-Soviet Central Asia, sources whose availability would be guaranteed by some political and military mechanism: in an emergency, the CSTO institutions could be mobilised to ensure the security of gas and oil production in the region. Secondly, a war against Iran could destabilise India's neighbour Pakistan, where radical Islamists are influential: this could amount to a serious threat to the stability of the whole region. While the question of whether Iran possesses nuclear weapons remains hypothetical, Pakistan on the other hand does have a successfully tested nuclear device..., which might then fall into Islamist hands. Thus, although Washington strives to keep India within the sphere of its own Asian policy, the prospect of a big blow-up in Asia would tend rather to impel India towards a union with Russia and China. In these conditions, Primakov's dream of a great Russo-SinoIndian union, which could take shape under SCO auspices, appears less unrealisable, despite the rivalry between India and China over political and military domination in Asia. But it would take a considerable time to build up real mechanisms for management and decision-making 13 .
9
It appears then that one of the major factors limiting the possibilities for geopolitical alliance between Russia and other countries in Asia is the Kremlin's failure, ever since 1991, to develop a long-term regional strategy. Sociologically, the fact that the Russian elite is concentrated in Moscow contributes to their indecisiveness about the regions lying east of the Urals, of which their knowledge is very incomplete. Most Russian Sinologists, such as Viktor Larin 14 or Yuri Galenovitch 15 , consider that the Russian government maintains very little control over the regions of the Russian Far East 16 . Russia cannot be ready for an alliance with China or India when it it is still at the stage of strengthening state control over the eastern part of its own territory.
A development in the Sino-Russian military balance of power unfavourable to Russia 10 The military factor is equally important in explaining the danger for Russia of an unbalanced union with China. The rundown in the Russian armed services since 1991 when combined with the strengthening of the Chinese army has altered the balance of power on the military level. The modernisation of the Russian army, as described in outline by Vladimir Putin in November 2005 at a meeting with staff officers of the federal army, seems for the present to be little more than words. Promises to modernise technical equipment between now and 2015 are no compensation for the fact that many servicemen are still being paid several months in arrears. Strengthening the Russian army seems to come down to saturation media coverage of a few token events: Putin in the cockpit of a Tu 160 nuclear bomber launching a new missile, Putin aboard the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, Putin awarding medals to special forces officers, Putin visiting a nuclear submarine launching a missile 17 ... On this occasion, the official press omitted to point out that the missiles being launched by the President had been built in the late 1980s and were thus inherited from Soviet technology... As the journalist Vladislav Shurygin makes clear in the Zavtra review 18 , the development programme for strategic nuclear forces is today under threat of interruption. The Russian military-industrial complex has already lost more than two hundred strategic technologies, for lack of competent staff. Shurygin reports that, for lack of funding, the work of the Institute for Thermal Research has had to be suspended, which has already led to a halt in the production of Topol M and Bulava missiles. The article accuses two ministers of sabotage-German Gref, Economics Minister, and Alexey Kudrin, Finance Minister. Similarly, in 2005, the Defence Ministry purchased only seven missiles: so today there remain only 600 nuclear missiles to ensure Russia's defence, several of which are apparently urgently in need of modernisation. Of Russia's 20,000 tanks, approximately only half are in working order; and of Russia's 1,800 aircraft, about 1,200 are no longer capable of taking off. The worst of it is that a country that exports so much oil-and that is planning to increase its exports to China-refuses to provide its own air-force with fuel, thus preventing its pilots from training. Since 2000, efforts to modernise the armed services have been limited to the acquisition of 15 T-90 tanks, 40 BTR-80 armoured cars, 24 SU-27 aircraft, three TU-160 bombers and two KA-50 helicopters. In order to rebuild its military credibility in Asia, the Russian army would need 1,500 new T-90 tanks a year for ten years. When it comes to the navy, we should note that, since 2000, the Russian fleet has received not one new ship 19 . During the manoeuvres in the Pacific in 2004, the Russian fleet was even compelled urgently to recruit civilian mechanics for lack of competent staff. In December 2004, the Northern Fleet disgraced itself when, in front of President Putin, a nuclear submarine was found incapable of launching its missile. The C-50 anti-aircraft defence system is no longer even in a position to protect the airspace around Moscow or Russia's other industrial centres. These failings in the modernisation of the Russian armed forces are even more troubling in that they coincide with China's reinforcement of its People's Liberation Army, which has not given up the option of a massive deployment of tanks and infantry: the threat posed by such overwhelming numbers of available troops is backed by China's huge population.
15 Given the condition of its armed forces, one may wonder whether Russia's means can really match up to its ambitions in seeking to strengthen its influence in Central Asia. Also, one needs to take account of domestic policy factors within the former Soviet Republics and in particular of the threats posed to the stability of the governments in place. as a pretext for sending troops to Kyrgyzstan and taking control of the Republic. In 2006, in the Kyrgyz town of Och, the headquarters of the war against terrorism and drug trafficking is to be established, in the charge of the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS), an arm of the CSTO. Setting up this HQ appears also to suit national Kyrgyz interests 24 : it could be a protective barrier for the state against unrest or civil war 25 . In Soviet times, a frontier guards base and an airbase were positioned at Och; this infrastructure has been well preserved and could rapidly be brought back into service by these collective regional stabilisation forces. 18 In the context of a peacemaking mission to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan would seem more legitimate than Uzbekistan: for one thing, the Kazakhs are ethnically and culturally much closer to the Kyrgyzes than the Uzbeks (in particular, they share with them a moderate approach to Islam); for another, Uzbekistan insists on its territorial claims to Kyrgyzstan, whereas Kazakhstan does not. For this reason, any attempt at interference from Tashkent in Kyrgyz affairs would create a significant risk of ethnic conflict, which might spread across the region if Kazakhs committed troops to help in Kyrgyzstan. 19 The likelihood of Russian intervention in the case of destabilisation of Kyrgyzstan is increased by rumours 26 of an intervention by special forces of Russian military intelligence, the GRU, in Bishkek, during the Tulip Revolution, at a time when the Kyrgyz army and police were in a state of paralysis. There exists, moreover, a precedent for intervention by post-Soviet Russia in Central Asia: in 1992, Russian special forces and frontier guards went into the city of Dushanbe in Tajikistan to carry out a bloody "peacemaking" operation. After the Russian frontier guards were withdrawn, according to the terms of the bilateral Russo-Tajik agreement of 2004, the Tajik-Afghan frontier came under the exclusive control of Tajik national forces. For all that, Russia has not cut back its military presence in that Republic: the 201st Division of the Russian Federal Army has been redeployed as a Russian military base in Tajikistan. Beyond its acceptance of the presence of Russian ground forces, the Tajik government has also permitted Russia to reactivate an airspace guidance centre set up during Soviet times in the Pamir Mountains, which will give Russia the means to control the airspace of Asia and the South Pacific.
20 Even so, the probability of Russian military interference in the case of a crisis in Kyrgyzstan is set back by the condition of the Russian forces at present based in the country, despite the existence of the Kant airbase. the change of course is difficult for the Uzbeks, it is just as hard for Russia to restore its own confidence in Tashkent. It is hardly likely that Uzbekistan will become, in the immediate future, Russia's closest partner in Central Asia-for the present it is Kazakhstan that plays this role. Indeed, the links between Kazakhstan and Russia are close and of long standing. In the mid-eighteenth century, the Kazakh Khanates (djuz) voluntarily sought Russian protection, to avoid the fate of the Dzungars, of whom more than a million were massacred a few years before by the Qing army 31 
Kazakhstan to play a dominant role in Central Asian affairs. Despite having only half the population, Kazakhstan is for the present better-suited for playing this role than Uzbekistan, because the Kazakhs are less influenced by radical Islamism. Moreover, the unemployment rate in Kazakhstan is lower than in Uzbekistan, and the country is not threatened by shortages of water resources. Further, Kazakhstan is also more politically stable: the government of Nursultan Nazarbayev seems safe from "colour revolutions", thanks mainly to its efficient security services. By contrast, the failure of the Uzbek authorities to control the situation in Andijan may be directly related to the policy on national security followed for more than a decade, favouring repression rather than propaganda, the mechanisms for which, inherited from the USSR, was dismantled. In years to come, Russia will be paying close attention to the succession to President Karimov's leadership: its expectation is that this will put the finishing touches to Uzbekistan's rapprochement with Russia.
A union between Moscow, Minsk and Astana?
24 In the short term, Russia's priority seems to be to strengthen its position within the CSTO and especially to pursue the process of integration with Kazakhstan and Belarus 33 while allowing the Commonwealth of Independent States to die a slow death. Founding a political, economic and military union around the "heart" of the Soviet UnionRussia, Belarus and Kazakhstan-is frequently mentioned by deputies of the Duma (the lower house of the Federal Parliament) and regional governors. One of the most ardent defenders of this cause is Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Duma deputy and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia-whose radical nationalist political programme is often useful to the Kremlin in attracting waves of criticism, before its essential proposals are taken up within federal government legislation. At the far end of the political spectrum, the idea of an alliance between former Soviet Republics receives a favourable reception among members of the Russian Communist Party, which is today Russia's main opposition party.
25 Forming a union of this kind can only be a painful process: it means that each of the countries taking part must give up part of its own sovereignty. Real integration presupposes that Russia will be able to propose forms of co-operation that will be really attractive to its neighbours. These might include creating a military union aimed at guaranteeing the survival of governments within a harshly competitive environment, or an economic union of sufficient weight to influence the movement of natural resources prices on the world market. Paradoxically, it seems that there is stronger resistance coming from Russia than from Belarus or Kazakhstan. Part of the Russian political elite is opposed to building up Russia within the post-Soviet area, preferring to see their country as an energy resource to the "civilised world"
34
. Russia does have the means to rebuild a union with its two closest neighbours, but Moscow is not making available the necessary funding. Instead of investing the income from its natural resources in economic programmes, social or military, it prefers to invest them in the American economy-on the pretext of guarding against inflation. In these circumstances, the prospect for building a real union across a substantial part of the post-Soviet area is still distant, and will depend on whether the governing classes truly desire to see their country strengthened. Indeed, the rebuilding of Russian power within its own region can be based only upon a change of domestic policy and a heightened desire to serve the national interest. Patriotism of this kind, such as is cultivated among China's elite, seems to be lacking in Russia.
Strengthening the CSTO, a response to the threat of war in Iran : the Iranian Foreign Minister was refusing Moscow's proposals. Russian television then announced that the Russian government had made every possible effort to avoid war in the region, but that Iran had not shown any co-operation: the Iranians' suicidal attitude was preventing Russia from blocking US attempts to launch a sanctions campaign against Iran. From now on, Russian diplomacy will be focused on the regional consequences arising from a potential military conflict. It envisages in particular the ecological disaster created by radioactive contamination of large areas of Central Asia and around the Caspian Sea, as well as the possible massive exodus of the Iranian population towards neighbouring countries-a humanitarian catastrophe that could be far greater than that experienced in Kosovo or Iraq and that would affect Russia's southern borders as well as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Armenia. . Indeed, if China saw itself forced into foreign aggression, its energy resources being limited, it might have to seek a substitute for Iranian oil with the utmost urgency. This energy requirement also drives China into strengthening its claim on the Russian energy market and on Kazakhstan. Yet, the infrastructure for transporting oil and gas from these territories towards China is not yet sufficiently developed to satisfy the needs of the Chinese economy. Accordingly, one may expect China soon to press for a speed-up in the building of the Angarsk-Daqing oil pipeline and the gas pipeline destined to link Kazakhstan with Xinjiang (the West-East project). 31 The two most important decisions announced during President Putin's visit to Peking in March 2006 were taken against this background: strengthening co-operation in the arms market (China wishing to acquire more military equipment from Russia) and cooperation over oil supplies (a co-operation that seemed to have been inactive since 2004). At the time of writing, China has been given no clear response from Russia on the timescale for starting building work on the Russian stretch of the Angarsk-Daqing oil pipeline. Furthermore, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has not been able to acquire any stock in the Russian oil company Sibneft, which would have given it a stake in the Russian market. Russia's recent concessions towards China-as agreed during Putin's visit-can be understood within the context of the threat of war against Iran: in exchange for a dominant position in the Chinese market in the fields of energy and military supplies, Russia agrees to supply oil and gas so long as deliveries are not interrupted by armed conflict. Thus, the contracts signed by Gazprom will make China the world's largest importer of Russian gas
39
. Two years ago, the project to build a gas pipeline from East Siberia into China did not exist; what has radically altered the state of play is the development of the situation in the Middle East. diversification of its energy sources, which Europe intends as a way of minimising its dependence on Russia, has been balanced, from Moscow's point of view, by diversifying Russia's outlets with the increase of business in the Far East. In this race, Russia is today further ahead than Europe. 33 On the military side, Russia has also begun taking preventive measures in case there should be war in Iran. On February 6th 2006, the Secretary-General of the CSTO, Nikolai Bordyuzha, went to Tashkent to propose to President Karimov that he should bring Uzbekistan speedily back into the CSTO, of which it was a member up until 1999. The two men also spoke about Uzbekistan joining the "Canal 2005" operation against terrorism and drug trafficking. The Uzbeks showed themselves helpful and responsive. The Uzbek army and special forces have made contact with their counterparts in CSTO member countries to stem the flow of drugs and radical Islamism out of Afghanistan.
34 Military chiefs of the unified command of the CSTO countries have prepared an agreement on "Collective forces in the collective security zone in Central Asia"
40
. One pillar of these collective forces will be the "rapid deployment force" of 11 battalions: three Russian, three Kazakh, three Tajik and two Kyrgyz. They will consist of special forces regiments, highly trained and well equipped. Russia is still ready to send reinforcements, battalions of heavy armour, communications battalions, several squadrons of transport aircraft and combat helicopters. Chinese army forces will not be part of this structure 41 . 35 In the long term, the creation of a military and political alliance in Central Asia would enable member countries of the CSTO to build a common policy in the energy field, towards the European Union and China in particular. Such a union would, in effect, permit them to dictate the price of oil and gas across the whole of the Eurasian area.
36 The creation of an alliance across the territory of the former Soviet Union, with Russia as a leading member, seems at the present time to be unlikely, due to the weakness of the Russian state. The battle between Russia and Ukraine over gas prices does not reflect the strengthening of Russia's position in the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Rather, it portends the dismantling of this organisation in its existing form. What are preventing Russia from building up a military presence in Central Asia are financial constraints. Over the months ahead, the most that can be achieved will probably be small military shows of force and photo opportunities: Putin at the controls of military aircraft. The rapprochement with China will take practical shape only within the limits of the SCO, that is to say, with no acceptance of mutual obligations. Furthermore, while Russia does favour the development of this organisation, it is mainly so that China, in playing its part, should fall in line with the collective decisions being taken, rather than pursue its own independent policy in Central Asia. Similarly, Russian initiatives within the context of the CSTO, of which China is not a member, are aimed at creating a force able to match China's power in Central Asia, to remedy the present weakness of each of the members in isolation. Changes in this inconsistent foreign policy would require changes in the Kremlin: a new leadership intent on developing the national economy and maintaining a reasonable distance both from the West and from China.
37 The vast majority of people within the Russian political elite do not favour the resurrection of the USSR; a union founded on compulsion would be useless. Russia needs loyal allies. Moscow's present eagerness in seeking out allies is a sign of weakness: if Russia were powerful, it would not have to go to such lengths to find friends. They would put themselves forward in a more natural way. Russia's contradictory manoeuvring vis-à-vis China denotes the fearfulness of a country that sees itself having to survive between two hostile powers: the West, which offers no prospect of co-operation, and China, more and more aggressive in its economic and military growth. In these circumstances, the Russians' approach is dictated by the wish to guarantee the present frontiers of their state. 
See the newspapers

4.
At the height of the Bishkek crisis, Russian television (www.ortv.ru) showed the intervention of several special forces groups, of "unidentified origin", entering the city to disperse the crowd.
5.
These would be Russian political movements of the left, the extreme left and the extreme right. 16. According to the Russian Federal Security Service, there are no statistics on the number of Chinese citizens in the Russian Federation, and specifically none on their numbers in the Russian Far East. The frontier guard service, which is part of the FSB and is the main body responsible for legal control of foreigners in Russia, collects absolutely no data on the numbers of foreigners. The figures that appear in the work of foreign researchers-or Russian researchers-can thus not be taken for anything better than estimates.
17.
Television reports of President Putin on board the nuclear bomber launching the missile were transmitted repeatedly on various Russian federal networks: www.ortv.ru www.rtr.ru www.ntv.ru www.newsru.com. 
22.
They are a group of analysts, including former Soviet and Russian information officers in retirement or still working. The group's website publishes articles-most written under pseudonyms: www.namakon.ru.
23
. A significant part of the Uyghur diaspora is settled in the capital cities of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
24.
Legally speaking, CSTO forces have the right-written into the treaty-to intervene in Kyrgyz affairs if the country's stability is threatened.
25.
Interviews carried out in CSTO agencies. 26. Russian television has broadcast coverage, but without comment. The Defence Ministry has neither confirmed nor denied the story.
27. Personal observations. 28. The CSTO members are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Apart from a few joint military exercises as well as some political dealings aimed at facilitating the defence of common positions within the SCO, the CSTO is still in an embryonic state.
